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Introduction
In the spring of 1874 the Japanese government dispatched a military force to south-
ern Taiwan ostensibly to “punish” a group of aborigines who had murdered ﬁfty-four 
people from Ryu¯kyu¯ late in 1871.1)  The ﬁrst ship of the invasion force, an old steam-
ship the Japanese government had purchased from the Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
Navigation Company and renamed the Yu¯ko¯-maru, departed Nagasaki on April 27 
bound for Amoy and the southwestern coast of Taiwan.  On board were various sup-
plies and arms, including two Gatling guns that the Japanese government had recently 
purchased with the help of an American advisor named Horace Capron, and more 
than a hundred people, including Japanese marines, members of a newly formed sig-
nal corps, and several Japanese military ofﬁcers.  Also on board were two American 
advisors, Douglas Cassel (1845–1875), a naval ofﬁcer hired by the Japanese to help di-
rect the expedition, and a former United States Army ofﬁcer named James Wasson 
(1847–1923).  Wasson resigned his commission in the U.S. Army in 1872 in order to 
work under Capron at the Hokkaido Colonization Ofﬁce (Kaitakushi ),2) and in April, 
1874 the Japanese Army hired Wasson away from the Hokkaido Colonization Ofﬁce 
so he could serve as a military engineer in the expeditionary force being sent to Tai-
wan.  In that capacity Wasson witnessed ﬁrsthand many of the events that took place 
in southern Taiwan and he wrote a detailed report for the Japanese government de-
scribing what he had seen.
Over the course of the early decades of the Meiji Period (1868–1912) the Japanese 
government hired several thousand foreign advisors, commonly called oyatoi gaikoku-
jin, to help the country modernize in the wake of the Meiji Restoration.  These foreign 
advisors worked in ﬁelds as diverse as law, politics, the military, transportation, indus-
trial technology, natural sciences, education, and the arts, and they drew generous sal-
aries from the government.  While foreign advisors had no authority to decide govern-
ment policy, they helped to implement the policies of the government and they 
provided valuable advice and guidance about how Japan could modernize its institu-
tions.3)  The Taiwan Expedition took place at the peak of the Japanese government’s 
effort to employ foreign advisors, and not surprisingly a number of foreigners contrib-
uted to the planning and implementation of the expedition.4)  Wasson’s role in the ex-
pedition was modest compared to that of many of the foreign advisors, but even in his 
limited role he witnessed directly much of what transpired in southern Taiwan.
Because of his ﬁrst-hand knowledge the report Wasson wrote provides one of the 
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most detailed accounts of what took place during the Japanese expedition.  The report 
includes many astute observations and assessments about the organization and capa-
bility of the Japanese forces that fought in southern Taiwan, and it provides a wealth of 
information about the complex local society that the Japanese dealt with during their 
occupation of the area.  This essay will examine Wasson’s assessment both of the na-
ture of the Japanese army that the government dispatched to southern Taiwan and of 
the characteristics of the society that the Japanese expedition encountered there.
Wasson and the Japanese Expedition to Taiwan
At the time of the Japanese expedition Wasson, a youthful 27 years old, had already 
distinguished himself in the U.S. Army.  Born in Ohio in 1847, Wasson grew up in a 
small town outside of Des Moines, Iowa.  His father, John, enlisted in a volunteer in-
fantry unit from Iowa that fought on the side of the Union states against the Confeder-
acy during the American Civil War.  His father left the army after a year because of 
poor health, but when Wasson turned seventeen in 1864 he enlisted in the same vol-
unteer unit his father had served in.  Wasson spent about a year and a half in the army 
and saw extensive action in battles that took place across several Southern states, be-
fore being discharged from service a few months after the war ended in 1865.5)
Wasson impressed his commanding ofﬁcer, and the military life apparently suited 
him.  In order to pursue a career in the Army, he secured an appointment to the Unit-
ed States Military Academy in 1867.  Wasson had received only a minimal education 
before attending West Point, but he excelled in his studies at the military academy de-
spite the difﬁculty of the curriculum.  In addition to excelling academically, Wasson 
also had the good fortune to form a friendship with a well-connected fellow cadet 
named Frederick Grant, the son of Ulysses S. Grant, the general in command of the 
Union Army during the Civil War and president of the United States from 1869 to 
1877.  Through his friendship with Frederick Grant, Wasson had the opportunity to so-
cialize with the president and that personal connection served Wasson well at several 
points in his career.  Wasson graduated ﬁrst in his class in 1871, and with the enviable 
support of a powerful patron the talented young soldier seemed destined for a superla-
tive career.
It is unclear why Wasson decided to go to Japan, but soon after graduating from 
West Point he began to lobby to work in Hokkaido under Horace Capron, who had 
served as a Commissioner in the Department of Agriculture under President Grant. 
Capron met Kuroda Kiyotaka, a hero of the Meiji Restoration and the future director 
of the Hokkaido Colonization Ofﬁce, when Kuroda visited the United States in 1871. 
Kuroda was impressed by Capron, and he recommended that the Japanese govern-
ment hire the American as an advisor to help with the development of Hokkaido, and 
Capron worked in that capacity from 1871 to 1875.  Wasson hoped to work under 
Capron, and President Grant wrote a letter on his behalf asking Capron to add Was-
son to his personal staff.  When Grant’s intercession failed to bear fruit, the president 
had Wasson’s commanding ofﬁcer give the young American an extended leave of ab-
sence from service (with advance pay) so he could visit Japan.  Wasson traveled to Ja-
pan in the autumn of 1871, on the same ship as Capron, and with the help of Charles 
DeLong, the American Minister to Japan, Wasson managed to secure from the Japa-
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nese government an appointment to the Hokkaido Colonization Ofﬁce.  He resigned 
his commission in the U.S. Army effective July 1, 1872, but he began to work for the 
Hokkaido Colonization Ofﬁce in March of that year, ﬁrst as a teacher and later as sur-
veyor-in-chief.6)
On April 1, 1874, Wasson transferred his position from the Hokkaido Colonization 
Ofﬁce to the Japanese Army in order to serve as an advisor for the upcoming expedi-
tion to Taiwan.  The Japanese Army gave Wasson the rank of colonel, a considerable 
improvement over the rank of second lieutenant he had held brieﬂy after graduating 
from West Point.  It is not clear why Wasson chose to participate in the expedition, but 
the chance to see military action may have enticed him, and he was certainly paid 
very well for his service to the Japanese government.7)
Wasson sailed for Taiwan on board the Yu¯ko¯-maru, the ﬁrst Japanese ship of the ex-
pedition to leave Nagasaki.  Consequently he was among the ﬁrst members of the ex-
peditionary force to disembark in Taiwan on May 6, 1874, and he attended all of the 
major meetings with local aborigine leaders that took place during the early months of 
the Japanese occupation of the south.  Because of his role as an advisor he was one of 
the few foreigners to have ﬁrst-hand knowledge of the situation the Japanese army ac-
tually encountered on the ground in southern Taiwan, and he directed the effort to 
build a temporary military camp to house the Japanese troops until a more permanent 
camp could be constructed.  His report shows that he put considerable thought into 
making the temporary camp as defensible as possible.  Wasson also witnessed ﬁrst-
hand some of the ﬁghting between the Japanese and the aborigines, and in other cases 
he was privy to debrieﬁngs of Japanese soldiers after battles or skirmishes.  Because of 
his role as an advisor he was in an excellent position to evaluate the performance of 
the Japanese Army.  Wasson spent several months in southern Taiwan, from the arriv-
al of the Japanese force in May until August, when illness compelled him to return to 
Nagasaki for medical treatment.  By then the military confrontation between the Japa-
nese and aborigines had been over for months and the occupation of southern Taiwan 
had settled into uneventful monotony.  While Wasson did not stay in southern Taiwan 
until the expeditionary force withdrew in late November and early December, his re-
port nevertheless gives us a detailed picture of the time when most of the political and 
military action took place.
For several years after the Japanese expedition Wasson continued to enjoy a suc-
cessful career until a bad gambling habit tempted him into embezzlement and ulti-
mately landed him in federal prison.  After the expedition Wasson spent another year 
in Japan teaching civil engineering in Tokyo, and during that time he married Marie 
Bingham, the daughter of John A. Bingham, who had replaced Charles DeLong as the 
American Minister in Japan on May 31, 1873.  Wasson returned to the United States in 
1876 where he assumed the post of Army Paymaster at the rank of major, a stunning 
increase in rank that he achieved at the direct intercession of President Grant.  After 
being posted to Texas he slowly fell into debt from real estate speculation and gam-
bling, and in 1883 he embezzled $24,000, nearly ten times his annual base pay, in or-
der to cover his debts.  His crime was quickly discovered and he was convicted and 
sentenced to eighteen months in prison.  After his release from prison Wasson worked 
in various jobs, mainly in civil engineering and selling insurance, but he had little last-
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ing success.  Many years later, when he was nearly 53 years old, Wasson enlisted again 
in the U.S. Army in order to ﬁght in the Spanish-American War.  Initially he was giv-
en the rank of sergeant, but his rank was reduced to private because he neglected his 
duties, and later he was court-martialed for drunkenness.  Wasson was clearly a talent-
ed soldier whose military career started brilliantly, and he capitalized on close person-
al relationships with powerful patrons to gain prestigious and important positions.  De-
spite these considerable advantages, however, success eluded him and his career 
ended in disappointment.8)
Wasson’s Report
In 1875, near the end of his year of service as an advisor to the Japanese Army, 
Wasson wrote a report to the Japanese government explaining what had happened 
during the expedition to Taiwan.  It was standard practice in the U.S. military for 
ofﬁcers to write reports to their superiors explaining what had taken place during bat-
tles and military engagements, and the Japanese ofﬁcers who served in Taiwan fol-
lowed a similar practice and wrote reports about the action that took place in southern 
Taiwan.9)  Douglas Cassel, the American naval ofﬁcer who advised the Japanese in 
southern Taiwan, also wrote many reports about the various negotiations he partici-
pated in, but while almost none of the original copies of his reports survive at least 
some of them were translated into Japanese and a few were sent back to the govern-
ment in Tokyo.10)  Wasson played a less important role in the expedition than did Cas-
sel, and since he did not lead any of the negotiations or participate in battle he had no 
need to write any status reports about his activities.  The report he wrote in 1875 there-
fore appears to be his only written account about the expedition, and it was probably 
intended to serve as Wasson’s ﬁnal debrieﬁng before he left the service of the Japanese 
Army.
Wasson’s report is addressed simply to “Sir,” but several clues show that it was in-
tended for O¯kuma Shigenobu, the ofﬁcial in charge of the Banchi jimukyoku, the gov-
ernment ofﬁce that managed the affairs of the expedition.  One of the tasks of the Ban-
chi jimukyoku was to record the activities of the expedition, and it even published a 
short ofﬁcial history of the affair,11) so it would be natural for the Banchi jimukyoku to 
want an account of the expedition from Wasson.  Wasson states that he is submitting 
the report to “Your Excellency,” indicating that the intended recipient had ministerial 
rank in the government, and that he is doing so “[i]n accordance with the instructions 
forwarded to me through Mr. Hirai….”12)  O¯kuma was the only ofﬁcial Wasson might 
have corresponded with who held ministerial rank, and Mr. Hirai refers to Hirai Yuki-
masa, a talented translator who handled nearly all of the correspondence between 
Charles LeGendre and O¯kuma.  We can infer from these references that O¯kuma in-
structed Wasson, through Hirai, to write a report about the expedition, probably for 
the records of the Banchi jimukyoku.
The report itself consists of 103 handwritten pages, and it is found among LeGend-
re’s papers in the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.  There appears to be only 
one copy of the report in existence, and apparently no Japanese translation was ever 
made.13) It is likely that Wasson prepared the report for O¯kuma and gave it to LeGen-
dre so he could have Hirai or someone else translate it and submit it to O¯kuma. 
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LeGendre’s papers contain clean copies of a signiﬁcant number of documents that 
were translated and submitted to the Banchi jimukyoku and that later ended up being 
preserved at the Japanese National Archives (Kokuritsu ko¯bunshokan).  It would have 
been normal under the circumstances for LeGendre’s secretary to prepare a clean 
copy of Wasson’s report for LeGendre’s records and to give Hirai the original report 
so he could translate it.  It is unclear why no copy or translation was ever made, but 
the most likely explanation is that during the hectic last few months before the Banchi 
jimukyoku shut down its operations and LeGendre left the employment of the Japanese 
government, LeGendre simply forgot about the report or decided that it was not im-
portant enough to go to the trouble of having it translated.  In the spring of 1875, 
months after Japanese forces had withdrawn from southern Taiwan and even after the 
Banchi jimukyoku had published its brief formal history of the expedition, Wasson’s re-
port may have seemed from LeGendre’s perspective to contain little of importance. 
Even O¯kuma’s request for Wasson to write a report conveys the impression of a loose 
end being tied up.  Still, while the report seems literally to have been forgotten at the 
time, it contains information that conﬁrms key evidence found elsewhere and it de-
scribes features of the expeditionary force and the local society that are mentioned no-
where else.
Wasson’s Description of the Expedition
Many of the descriptive sections of Wasson’s report provide information similar to 
what can be found in other sources, such as a letter that Cassel wrote to LeGendre in 
May, 1874, a narrative of the expedition written by Edward H. House, and various re-
ports that Saigo¯ Tsugumichi sent back to the Japanese government.14)  Consequently, 
Wasson’s report provides important conﬁrmation of information found in other sourc-
es, but it also describes a number of aspects of the Japanese operations in southern 
Taiwan that cannot be found elsewhere.  Much of the unique information in the report 
is based on observations and judgments that Wasson made as a trained army ofﬁcer, 
and for that reason the source is particularly important.
The report explains the Japanese occupation of southern Taiwan more or less 
chronologically.  It begins with a brief recitation of how Wasson came to write the re-
port, his assigned duties during the expedition, and his passage to southern Taiwan, 
with a lengthy digression to explain the systems of signals that he tried to teach to the 
Japanese soldiers during the voyage (217–220).15)  Next, the report describes what hap-
pened immediately after the expeditionary force arrived in southern Taiwan, including 
Wasson’s efforts to construct a temporary camp for the Japanese forces (220–224). 
This section is followed by an account of the ﬁrst meeting between Cassel, who nego-
tiated on behalf of the Japanese, and the aborigine leader named Issa, as well as ac-
counts of the ﬁrst skirmishes between the Japanese and aborigines and a second meet-
ing with Issa, which was attended by Saigo¯ Tsugumichi (224–240).  The next section 
describes the planning and implementation of the main attack on the aborigines that 
took place from June 1 to June 3, and a meeting with aborigines a few days after the 
attack (240–248).  The last section of the report offers a number of general observa-
tions about local society in southern Taiwan, and it closes with a brief explanation of 
Wasson’s return to Nagasaki and a word of thanks to Saigo¯ and the other Japanese 
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ofﬁcers (248–256).
The inﬂuence of Wasson’s training as an army ofﬁcer is obvious in many of the 
comments he makes in the report.  For example, the early pages of the report describe 
in some detail two speciﬁc duties that the Japanese government assigned to him be-
cause of his professional expertise: to train members of the Japanese Army in a system 
of signals, and to prepare a temporary camp for the Japanese force.  Wasson’s efforts 
to train the Japanese signalmen does not appear to be mentioned in any other sources, 
and even though his efforts were not especially successful the plan nevertheless shows, 
especially in the context of the effort to hire foreign advisors in the mid-Meiji period, 
that the Japanese government hoped to learn as much as possible from its foreign mili-
tary advisors during the expedition.  Wasson explains that he was ordered to instruct 
the forty “ofﬁcers and men of the signal corps” in a “system of signals somewhat simi-
lar to that used in the Army of the United States,” and for that purpose the signal 
corps was sent on the ﬁrst steamship to depart for Taiwan (217–218).  The system, Was-
son explains, was essentially the same as the one used in the U.S. Army and Navy. 
The American system used ﬂags to signal binary values (ones and twos) that could be 
combined to indicate the letters of the alphabet.  Since the members of the signal 
corps could not speak English, Wasson adapted the system to use katakana so messag-
es could be sent in Japanese.  He does not explain the way the system was adapted or 
the role that the Japanese signalmen must have played in adapting it.  He does ex-
plain, however, that he soon learned he could send messages as quickly and easily in 
katakana as in English.  The plan was for the signal corps to learn the system during 
their passage to Taiwan, but they did not make much progress partly because the 
weather was rough and most of them became seasick but also, as Wasson notes, be-
cause the signalmen had “an imperfect understanding of the importance of the 
work…” (219).  Wasson’s politic observation barely conceals a concern about the Japa-
nese force that recurs several times during his report: the Japanese did not under-
stand—or perhaps more precisely did not care about—the techniques of organiza-
tion, discipline, and communication necessary for coordinated military action in a 
modern army.
In the end, the signal corps never used the system that Wasson devised.  During the 
main battle that took place from June 1 to June 3, where the Japanese forces split into 
three columns for their attack on the aborigines, the commanders of at least two of the 
columns communicated with each other using mortars (247).  Wasson neglects to ex-
plain how the mortars were actually used but it would seem to be a more effective 
method of communication in mountainous territory than signaling by ﬂag.  After the 
ﬁghting ended most of the signal corps was sent back to Japan, but Wasson once again 
commenced training the members who remained in southern Taiwan how to signal, 
and he notes that “I had the pleasure of showing General Saigo a drill which would il-
lustrate the usefulness of the system” (250).  Since his report apparently was never de-
livered, it is unlikely that O¯kuma Shigenobu ever learned of Wasson’s argument that a 
well-trained signal corps would be a great advantage to the Japanese military.
The expeditionary force proﬁted more directly from Wasson’s army training when 
he helped plan and build fortiﬁcations for a temporary camp after the ﬁrst shipload of 
troops arrived in southern Taiwan.  In his narrative of the Taiwan Expedition, E. H. 
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House includes a sometimes colorful account of the construction of the temporary 
camp, but House’s account is based on his personal observations and it provides little 
indication of the military thinking behind the construction of the camp.16)  Wasson, by 
contrast, explicitly spells out the camp’s military rationale.  In devising the plan for the 
camp Wasson anticipated four potential adversaries that the Japanese might have to 
face: 1) the local Chinese and mixed-race community, 2) the Chinese Army, 3) the 
Chinese Navy, and 4) the aborigines.17)  Wasson seemed to think that, at least until the 
bulk of the Japanese forces had arrived, the local Chinese and mixed-race population 
posed the greatest potential threat.  As he put it, “…we [the Japanese force] were only 
a little more than a hundred men against several thousand” (221).  The local residents 
were civilians but they carried arms as a matter of course and during the ﬁrst couple of 
weeks of the occupation they could have completely eliminated the Japanese if they 
had wanted to.  “It was desirable at this time,” Wasson therefore explained, “to deal 
carefully with these people, for much depended on preserving friendly relations with 
them” (221).  The site for the camp and the fortiﬁcations were selected and planned 
with the threat from these potential adversaries in mind.
Soon after the ﬁrst Japanese ship had arrived Cassel, Wasson, and several Japanese 
ofﬁcers explored the area around Liangkiao in search of a site for the temporary camp. 
They decided to place the camp in a ﬁeld near the bay, a location that would make it 
easy to evacuate or reinforce the soldiers from the sea.  With the bay at their backs, a 
small river on one side and a stream on the other, water provided the ﬁrst line of de-
fense on three sides of the camp.  The site of the camp lay between the largest village 
in the area, a Chinese immigrant community called Chashiang (Checheng 車城) to the 
north, and to the south Shaliao (射寮), a mixed-race community that had inﬂuential 
ties to the aborigines.  Another village lay near the camp, probably Shinke (新街), a 
small branch village of Shaliao.  In order to prevent any of these villages from being 
occupied by the Chinese Army Wasson built lightly fortiﬁed areas (redoubts) on the 
northern and southern sides of the camp and placed within them small ﬁeld artillery. 
Although the guns were light, they were enough to permit the Japanese to shell the 
surrounding villages and prevent them from being occupied.  The redoubt on the 
north side of the camp was the larger of the two and it was situated so that the Japa-
nese could shell either Chashiang or Chinese ships that might attack from the north 
(223).  In describing this and other camps that the Japanese established, Wasson noted 
that none of them had any signiﬁcant protection from the sea so the expeditionary 
force would have to rely on the Japanese Navy for defense if the Chinese Navy at-
tacked (249).  The various camps were only lightly fortiﬁed in order to provide protec-
tion against infantry attacks, and the rough terrain in the area made it unlikely that the 
Chinese Army would be able to use artillery.
Wasson placed an extended riﬂe pit across the front of the camp, facing toward the 
mountains.  The land in front of the camp was ﬂat and provided little cover for an at-
tacking force, and the fortiﬁcations that Wasson built made it possible for “the whole 
extent of the country in front [of the camp] to be brought under a deadly ﬁre of mus-
ketry.”  The Japanese had also purchased two Gatling guns for use in the expedition, 
and Wasson placed the larger of them in a “retired salient,” an inward bulge in center 
of the front line of fortiﬁcations that gave the Gatling gun a wide range of ﬁre (223). 
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The fortiﬁcations were simple but sufﬁcient to protect against the greatest potential 
threats.  At this point, the aborigines posed no real threat to the Japanese because they 
would not descend from the mountains in order to attack the Japanese camp directly.
In addition to introducing a system of signals and constructing a temporary camp, 
Wasson also provided other advice and assistance to the Japanese.  In particular, he 
attended two early meetings with the leaders of the aborigine villages and he helped 
to plan the main battle against the belligerent aborigine villages.  Wasson’s account of 
the two meetings does not differ substantially from the account written by Cassel, and 
there are several reasons to favor Cassel’s account over Wasson’s.  To begin with, Cas-
sel took the lead in negotiating with the aborigines on behalf of the Japanese, whereas 
Wasson merely observed the negotiations, and for that reason Cassel’s account is more 
important.  Secondly, Wasson wrote his account from memory several months after 
the meetings took place.  As a result his account contains less detail than Cassel’s, 
which was written immediately after the meetings took place, and Wasson’s account 
contains a few mistakes about when events happened.  Finally, Cassel’s account was 
translated into Japanese almost immediately, and later published, so it actually 
inﬂuenced the policy decisions that the government made and it has long been avail-
able to historians.  Because Cassel’s account was translated and published, the particu-
lars of the meetings with the aborigines, at least as they were seen from the Japanese 
side, are well known.18)  For these reasons Wasson’s account of the meetings will not 
be explained here.
Wasson’s description of the central role that Cassel played in planning the main 
battle against the aborigines is a different matter, however, since it contains revealing 
information that cannot be found in any other source.  The various reports about the 
main battle against the aborigines that Saigo¯ sent back to the government in Japan 
make no mention of the crucial role Cassel played.  In his letter to LeGendre on May 
24, Cassel writes that he “had been engaged in drawing the plan of a little campaign in 
case the Boutans should take the initiative whereby I felt sure of ‘bagging’ the whole 
ﬁghting force of the tribe” (209; emphasis in original).  Aborigines from the village of 
Butan (牡丹; Boutan in Cassel’s letter and Wasson’s report) were suspected of murder-
ing the Ryu¯kyu¯ans in 1871, but Butan was often assisted by the nearby village of Kusa-
kut (高士佛; Kussikut in Wasson’s report) and for that reason Cassel’s plan focused on 
those two villages.  Cassel tells LeGendre in his letter that his “guides,” two men from 
Shaliao named Mia and Kien who had helped LeGendre in the past, told him that the 
people of Butan had made fortiﬁcations at a local pass called “Stone Doors” (usually 
called Stone Door by Westerners and later known in Japanese as Sekimon).  According 
to Mia and Kien the aborigines intended to make a stand there.  Cassel writes,
I had examined people from Hong Kang and from different points near the Bou-
tan country, and I felt sure that by an advance from Hong Kang in a night 
march, while a diversion was made at the same time at the ‘Stone Doors’ to bring 
the Boutans down the valley, I could get them in such a trap that they could not 
escape. [209]
Cassel was vexed when Japanese soldiers disobeyed orders and advanced into the ab-
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original territory on May 22 in order to engage the aborigines at Stone Door because 
it disrupted his plan and probably reduced the effectiveness of future action against 
Butan.  Irrespective of the merits of his plan, we learn from Cassel’s account that he 
spoke to local mixed-race residents from Shaliao, people from Hongkang (楓港)—a 
coastal village some 10 miles to the north of the camp—and from others “near the 
Boutan country” (probably people from mixed-race villages) in order to learn about 
the roads into the aboriginal territory that the Japanese could use for their attack.  The 
main battle against the aborigines that actually took place on June 1–3 unfolded more 
or less according to the plan that Cassel formulated around May 22.
Wasson’s report provides substantially more information about Cassel’s role in 
planning the main battle against the aborigines.  Wasson describes, for example, how 
Cassel gathered information:
In the meantime, since the 22nd inst.  preparations for the campaign against the 
Boutans and Kussikuts were being made as rapidly and quietly as possible.  In 
order to insure the success of the expedition it was necessary to collect all the in-
formation regarding the positions of the principal villages, the roads or paths 
leading to them and the number of ﬁghting men that they could probably bring 
against us, that could be had.  In the absence of maps of the country which 
would furnish the desired information about the roads and the character of the 
country generally, we had to rely upon the knowledge which could be obtained 
from the Chinese and half castes [mixed-race residents], many of whom were 
more or less familiar with the hostile territory in question. [240]
Wasson then describes the three “roads,” often little more than mountain paths that 
followed stream beds, that led to the villages of Butan and Kusakut.  Wasson contin-
ued,
Several days were spent in collecting the most accurate information that was to 
be had respecting these different roads.  Guides were procured and examined 
separately and their different accounts carefully compared until we were satisﬁed 
that we had learned all that was known about the different routes, the distances 
to the villages &c.…  The greater part of this information was obtained by Cap-
tain Cassel from the natives, through the English speaking interpreter Johnson, 
who was of great assistance in all communication with the savages, or people of 
Liang Kiao Valley. [241–242]
The “natives” mentioned by Wasson probably were Chinese from Chashiang and 
Hongkang as well as people from mixed-race villages such as Shaliao, Shinke, and 
Poliak (保力), since those villages provided the guides for the main attack.  All of these 
villages used some version of the Fujian dialect, the dialect spoken by the interpreter 
Johnson.  We can see from Wasson’s account, therefore, the central role Cassel played 
in gathering the information needed to formulate the plan for attacking the aborigines.
Cassel apparently wrote a memorandum to Saigo¯ explaining his plan for the attack 
on Butan and Kusakut, but the memo does not appear to be mentioned in any of the 
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Japanese sources, nor does the original survive.  Wasson includes a copy of the memo 
in his report, however, and it outlines the plan to send Japanese troops into the moun-
tains via three columns that would travel through Hongkang, Chiksha (竹社) and 
Stone Door.  The actual attack took place more or less according to Cassel’s plan, as 
can be seen in the letter Saigo¯ wrote to Sanjo¯ Sanetomi explaining the battle (Saigo¯’s 
letter covers reports from the commanders and staff ofﬁcers who led each of the three 
columns during the attack).19)
Near the end of his report Wasson includes a further “extract” from Cassel’s memo 
which consists of a table that lists information about villages in southern Taiwan.  The 
table lists the names of the villages, the number of “ﬁghting men” in each village, the 
name of the village leader, and whether the village was likely to be friendly or hos-
tile.20)  Wasson does not identify the memo clearly, but it probably was part of the 
memo mentioned above that gave the plan of attack on Butan and Kusakut.  Wasson 
does explain the provenance of the information quite clearly, however:
In making this table Captain Cassel questioned many people at different times 
and compared their separate accounts until he had gotten what he thought was 
the most authentic information of the points. [255]
The information in the table was therefore gathered during the inquiries described 
above that Cassel made in preparation for the attack.  Wasson’s description of Cassel’s 
role and the excerpts he provides from Cassel’s memorandum to Saigo¯ show more 
clearly than any other available evidence the centrality of Cassel’s role in advising 
Saigo¯ on how to undertake the attack against Butan and Kusakut.
Perhaps the most interesting features of Wasson’s report are the extensive observa-
tions and criticisms he makes about the organization and operations of the Japanese 
expeditionary force.  Cassel, unlike Wasson, made a number of extremely caustic criti-
cisms about the Japanese Army in southern Taiwan, for example, describing General 
Tani Tateki as a “little imbecile” and sharply questioning Admiral Akamatsu Noriyo-
shi’s tactical judgment and his lack of control over the men under his command.  Cas-
sel did so in a letter to LeGendre, however, and not in a report written directly to one 
of the key leaders of the Japanese government.  Wasson was more politic than Cassel 
in his report to O¯kuma, but he nevertheless voiced criticisms about Japanese indiffer-
ence toward tactical planning and about the general lack of discipline among the Japa-
nese troops.
Both Cassel and Wasson believed that the Japanese should plan and execute a sin-
gle decisive attack against the aborigines, and their thinking led to the attack that took 
place on June 1–3, but the Japanese soldiers clearly chafed at the restraint that Cassel 
tried to impose on them.  The simultaneous attack from multiple directions that Cassel 
envisioned required careful preparation: he had to gain the cooperation of the local 
Chinese and mixed-race population, to gain the support (or at least the neutrality) of 
as many aborigine villages as possible, to identify the routes of attack that the Japanese 
troops could use, to estimate the time it would take for different contingents to arrive 
at the target, and to gauge the strength and location of potential hostile forces.  As he 
undertook these tasks Cassel often found himself frustrated as Japanese soldiers, some-
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times with the support of ofﬁcers, engaged in various skirmishes that threatened to dis-
rupt his plan completely.
One troublesome incident occurred when Akamatsu took the corvette Nisshin to 
Kwaliang Bay on May 18 and launched a small boat to conduct surveys.  Aborigines 
from the village of Koalut (龜仔角) shot at the Japanese boat with their muskets, but 
even though no one was injured an outraged Akamatsu insisted on leading an imme-
diate attack on Koalut and the nearby mixed-race village of Lingluan (龍鑾), which 
had nothing to do with the incident.  Cassel, who thought Akamatsu’s plan was well 
conceived, managed to persuade the Japanese ofﬁcer not to attack the villages because 
it would have completely destroyed Cassel’s effort to win the support or neutrality of 
the aborigine villages in the area.  Cassel also criticized the “unauthorized” movement 
of small parties of ofﬁcers and men toward the foothills near the aboriginal territory. 
By unauthorized he meant that he had not approved of the movements, but often the 
soldiers were acting under the orders of their commanding ofﬁcers (207–208).  Again, 
Cassel objected because the Japanese forays ran the risk of provoking a ﬁght that 
might disrupt the effectiveness of the major attack that he had in mind.
Wasson also mentions the incident involving Akamatsu, but suggests that the plan 
to attack Koalut was set aside not because of Cassel’s objections but rather because 
skirmishes between the Japanese and villagers from Butan had escalated into a major 
battle at Stone Door on May 22.  Wasson is diplomatic in explaining how all of the 
trouble began.  He writes, “We had some thought of establishing a small post at some 
distance back from the coast near the foot hills of the mountains in which the Boutans 
had their villages and stronghold” (230).  Cassel criticized the Japanese more bluntly. 
He explained to LeGendre that Akamatsu had decided to establish the camp about 
two miles inland, and Cassel had considered the plan a mistake (208).  When a small 
party of Japanese went inland on May 17 to scout for a location for the camp they 
were attacked by aborigines and one of the soldiers was killed and decapitated.  In 
contrast to Cassel, who voiced frustration at seeing his plan undermined, Wasson fo-
cused both on the lack of discipline among the Japanese soldiers, which exposed them 
unnecessarily to ambushes, and on their lack of appreciation of the risks posed by the 
aborigines’ guerilla tactics:
It seems that these men were allowed to straggle in rather a loose manner con-
sidering that they were in the presence of an enemy who would be only too glad 
to take advantage of an opportunity to surprise any small party which he could 
hope to overpower easily.  Both Captain Cassel and I had repeatedly called the 
attention of ofﬁcers to this important subject, and had advised that strict orders 
should be issued, forbidding small parties from leaving the camp without proper 
authority; and enjoining the greatest caution on the part of ofﬁcers in command 
of parties sent out on duty of any kind….  [The aborigines’] mode of ﬁghting, like 
that of all savages is to skulk under cover and wait for a moment when they can 
surprise an enemy or take him at some disadvantage.  The only way to carry on 
a war against such an enemy is to adopt to a certain extent their own tactics; 
mere pluck and bravery are not sufﬁcient; united with these qualities must be 
caution in avoiding an ambuscade and some skill in improving every advantage 
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which the character of the country presents….  [W]hen the matter was reported 
to us both Captain Cassel and myself repeated our former cautions and repre-
sented the great importance of enforcing at all times the strictest discipline 
among the men…. [230–232]
The important matter for Wasson was, in other words, to maintain discipline in order 
to avoid unnecessary skirmishes wherever possible and to minimize the risk of am-
bushes when Japanese soldiers had to venture near the strongholds of the aborigines.
At the heart of the objections about discipline that Cassel and Wasson raised lay an 
important philosophical difference about the nature of warfare.  Both Cassel and Was-
son had fought in the American Civil War and had seen a war of attrition ﬁrsthand, 
and they operated according to the expectation that a modern army should engage in 
ﬁghting according to strict operational planning and discipline because doing so would 
reduce casualties and increase the likelihood of victory.  They also understood, if not 
from direct experience then at least from general knowledge of the wars that the U.S. 
Army had fought against Native Americans, that the aborigines of southern Taiwan—
whom they unselfconsciously called “savages”—posed a serious and potentially lethal 
threat.  The Japanese soldiers serving in southern Taiwan, by contrast, belonged to a 
dramatically different kind of army than the one Cassel and Wasson knew.  It was a 
hybrid force, consisting mainly of contingents of conscripts from the Kumamoto garri-
son but also of volunteers from Kagoshima, Shirakawa (present-day Kumamoto), and 
a few other prefectures.  Saigo¯ Takamori reportedly recruited the volunteers at the re-
quest of Saigo¯ Tsugumichi, and it is possible that many of them were expelled from 
the Imperial Guard (Konoe ) or the Tokyo police force (Keishicho¯) during the controver-
sy in 1873 over whether to invade Korea.21)  The soldiers who exhibited the worst dis-
cipline and risked disrupting Cassel’s plan the most belonged to the volunteers, all of 
whom were shizoku, a new designation for former samurai created soon after the Meiji 
Restoration.  The troublemakers, in other words, belonged to a class of soldiers who 
likely understood warfare not in terms of discipline and planning but rather in terms 
of the samurai ethos of bravery and the willingness to take risks in order to gain hon-
or, and many of them had a strong desire to engage in combat.  For these reasons the 
volunteers undoubtedly chafed at the restraint that Cassel expected of them.
The contrasting attitudes toward combat appear most clearly in Wasson’s descrip-
tion of the battle at Stone Door on May 22.  On the previous day a party of a dozen 
soldiers went a mile or two towards the hills and were ambushed by aborigines as they 
returned to the Japanese camp.  Wasson described with obvious dismay the lack of 
discipline shown by the soldiers who responded to the attack by rushing from the 
camp to the scene of the ambush:
I was very anxious to see how the men would behave on the march and in action 
and therefore accompanied the troops on this occasion….  In going out it was 
necessary to cross a large stream (the one that empties just north of camp) some 
three or four times; the water was about waist deep and the current very rapid, 
but the men dashed over these places in ﬁne style and went ahead again at full 
speed.  One thing struck me very forcibly on the way; this was the want of order 
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among the troops.  The companies had been properly formed in the camp on 
starting but in a short time the ranks were broken and when the rivers were 
crossed those that got out ﬁrst dashed ahead without waiting to reform ranks and 
the march out soon became a mere race to see who would get to the scene of the 
action ﬁrst.  Had it turned out that the enemy were in full force and meant to 
ﬁght the result of the lack of discipline and system would have been felt very se-
verely.  The troops had they been met at some point of the road by a heavy ﬁre 
would have gone into the ﬁght in an irregular, disorderly manner, and once they 
became excited their ofﬁcers could have exercised very little control over them. 
[233]
While Wasson was appalled at the disorderly sight of soldiers racing to be ﬁrst to the 
battleﬁeld, it made perfect sense from the perspective of the volunteers who sought 
glory and recognition precisely by being ﬁrst in battle.
Wasson repeatedly praised the bravery of the Japanese soldiers and the stoic way 
they endured discomfort, but while the character of the soldiers impressed him their 
lack of discipline concerned him:
Our superiority over the savages consists in our better discipline and arms; but if 
we neglect the former we throw away our advantage needlessly.  I call attention 
to these points not to ﬁnd fault, but to show how the effectiveness of the army 
could, by attention to these be much increased.  I do so because I take a deep in-
terest in these matters and would like to see the Japanese army as good and 
efﬁcient as any in the world; the material of which it is composed is as good as 
any that can be found in any country and only needs proper training to disci-
pline. [234]
Wasson’s repeated comments about the lack of discipline suggest he saw it as the great-
est weakness of the Japanese Army.
The Japanese soldiers, including in some cases the ofﬁcers, also showed a troubling 
disregard for following orders.  As evening fell on May 21, Wasson advised the ofﬁcers 
in command that the soldiers should all return to camp since they would likely want 
to press further into the aboriginal territory if they spent the night in the ﬁeld, and 
thereby disrupt the plan that Cassel was formulating.  The ofﬁcers ignored Wasson’s 
advice, and the next morning the soldiers in fact advanced farther into the aboriginal 
territory and provoked the battle at Stone Door.  The Japanese walked straight into a 
well-designed ambush where the aborigines were able to ﬁre down upon them to great 
effect.  As Wasson warned, once the ﬁghting began the soldiers became excited and 
when their commanding ofﬁcer Sakuma Samata ordered them to retreat in order to 
avoid a premature general engagement they ignored the order and fought on, only 
heeding the order to disengage after they drove the aborigines out of their stronghold 
(235–236).  Cassel was livid when he heard what happened.  “Judge of my disgust 
then,” he wrote to LeGendre, “when, on the morning of the 22nd, the company which 
had been in bivouac during the night advanced into this pass instead of returning as 
they had been ordered…” (209; emphasis in original).  He complained to Akamatsu 
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Noriyoshi who, according to Cassel, “protested that the men had acted without orders, 
and that he had ordered the immediate withdrawal of all forces from that locality so 
that my plan would still hold good” (209).  The inclination of the soldiers—and some 
of the ofﬁcers—to ignore orders probably had several causes, among them the fact 
that Cassel, an American, had power at least nominally to direct the actions of the 
Japanese troops.  The nature of the expeditionary force also contributed to the lack of 
discipline concerning orders.  The volunteers, in particular, placed little importance in 
the sort of discipline that Cassel and Wasson expected.  Because of its hybrid nature 
and the ethos of some of the soldiers who fought in it, the Japanese Army that the 
American advisors witnessed was not yet as good and efﬁcient as a modern army.
Wasson’s report also includes useful information about the complex hybrid society 
of Chinese, aborigines, and mixed-race residents who lived in southern Taiwan at the 
time of the expedition.  No indigenous accounts of the Japanese occupation of south-
ern Taiwan were written, although some information has been preserved in the oral 
tradition of the aborigines,22) but there are a number of foreign accounts about the 
people and society of southern Taiwan that provide a fairly detailed, if biased, view of 
the people and culture of the area.23)  As I have explained elsewhere, these foreign ac-
counts provide insights into the human geography of southern Taiwan that help us to 
understand where different population groups lived, how they organized themselves 
economically and politically, and in some cases how they subsisted.24)  These foreign 
sources divided local society into groups that consisted of descendants of Chinese im-
migrants, aborigines, and mixed-race families that resulted from intermarriage be-
tween Chinese and aborigine families.  An informal boundary separated the aborigine 
villages from the Chinese and mixed-race villages, but marriage, travel, and trade took 
place across the boundary.  The most important characteristic of local society, howev-
er, was probably its violence.  For example, aborigine villages were designed for de-
fense, usually being surrounded by bamboo thickets to prevent attacks, and male resi-
dents throughout the south—Chinese, mixed-race, and aborigine alike—typically 
carried ﬁrearms whenever they left their villages.
Wasson mentions many of these features of local society in his report, but in con-
trast to most Western and Japanese visitors to the area he devoted comparatively more 
attention to the local Chinese population.  One passage in particular describes the lo-
cal Chinese in some detail:
The valley is quite thickly populated, the people being gathered into small villag-
es; the principal of which are Chasiang, Sialiao, Biah &c. &c.  The former of 
those has a population of more than one thousand.  These people are colonists 
from different parts of the China Coast opposite and are generally a thrifty indus-
trious people.  Those from different parts of China gather into separate villages 
each of which is quite independent having its own local government, the wealthi-
est man of the village being its chief, but exercising his authority only over his 
own village, and perhaps over some small hamlets which are dependent on the 
main village, having sprung up after it as the population increased and the lands 
cultivated by it were extended.  The same difference in dialects is found here as 
in China, which would of course be expected.  The people from Canton, from 
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Hong Kong and from Amoy and other places bring their own dialects, and as 
they live in villages entirely separate these differences remain, though, perhaps, 
not so strongly marked as in the mother country, since owing to their close prox-
imity there is more intercourse between these villages than is the case in China 
between the parent provinces.  There seems always to have been much quarrel-
ing between these villages themselves, and also between the villages and the sav-
ages….  On our ﬁrst arrival we noticed that all the men, and even the boys from 
twelve to fourteen years of age carried arms at all times.  At ﬁrst we supposed 
this was as a protection from the savages, but we afterward learned that it was as 
much for protection from each other.  Only a few days after we landed at Sialiao 
one of these village feuds broke out in full force….  The question at issue was ap-
parently a triﬂing one involving a few dollars, and was settled by a battle in 
which four or ﬁve men were killed.  On the day following this ﬁght one of the 
parties surprised a boy belonging to the other village, plowing in a ﬁeld and 
killed him, carrying away his head as a trophy. [252–253]
Wasson indicates here that descendants from different parts of the mainland had set-
tled in the area, and that while the Chinese villages had to interact with each other out 
of necessity they did not always enjoy friendly relations.  The description of the feud 
between Chinese villages that resulted in the murder and decapitation of a young boy 
is especially striking because it suggests that some Chinese residents adopted some of 
the tactics of the aborigines.  None of the other foreign sources about southern Taiwan 
mention this incident, or similar cases of Chinese decapitating their enemies, so the in-
cident may have been unique or at least a rare example, but it is unlikely that Wasson 
was mistaken.  The incident occurred soon after the Japanese force arrived in the 
south and Wasson surely would have kept a careful eye on any cases of violence or 
potential military threats in the area.
Although Wasson paid some attention to the local Chinese population, the aborigi-
nes were a more important focus because of the threat they posed and because of the 
expedition’s mission to “punish” them.  Foreign accounts of aboriginal society often 
include descriptions of the ﬁghting tactics that the aborigines used, and Wasson’s re-
port is no exception.  Since many of the foreign visitors to the area were current or 
former members of the military their accounts usually had a distinctly military color. 
They describe how the aborigines used the terrain to their best advantage, and tried to 
avoid exposure to gunﬁre themselves while drawing their enemies into ambushes 
through constant movement, feints, and deception.  Foreign accounts show clearly that 
the aborigines put considerable effort and planning into their defense.
Wasson’s report provides a particularly insightful description of the planning and 
preparation that the aborigines put into the defense of their territory.  Wasson de-
scribes, for example, the location that the villagers of Butan chose for their defense 
against the Japanese attack on June 1:
Just as dark came on we entered a wood near the summit of the mountain over 
which we were passing; here the savages had cut down the trees and so interwo-
ven them as to make an almost impassable barricade.  Still we saw nothing of the 
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savages, though had even a small force been stationed at this place it would have 
been difﬁcult to dislodge them from it.  It was evident that it was here that they 
had meant to give us battle, and the place had been skillfully chosen, and had 
been made as strong as was possible.  Even without opposition the troops could 
only creep through the trees; in many places the road was so effectually vaned 
that men had to be sent ahead with axes to chop away the barricade before we 
could pass. [246]
The Japanese attacked Butan from three directions, and by the time the Japanese 
reached the barricade that Wasson describes the ﬁghters from Butan had ﬂed.  From 
this passage one can sense not only Wasson’s relief that the barricade was deserted, 
but also the wary respect he had for the ﬁghting ability of the aborigines.
Conclusions
It seems a waste that Wasson’s report never reached O¯kuma Shigenobu, but per-
haps in the end it would have had little inﬂuence on Japanese policy even if O¯kuma 
had read it.  Still, the report contains much of historical interest.  It conﬁrms a number 
of facts about the expedition that are mentioned in other sources written by key par-
ticipants such as the American advisor Douglas Cassel and the Japanese leader of the 
expedition Saigo¯ Tsugumichi, or key observers such as the journalist E. H. House.  It 
also provides a useful account of Wasson’s own contributions to the expedition, such 
as his instructing a signal corps and preparing a temporary camp for the expeditionary 
force, and it provides a description of the local Chinese and mixed-race community 
and the style of ﬁghting and defensive tactics used by the aborigines.
Wasson’s report is most revealing, however, in the descriptions that were shaped by 
his knowledge and experience as a soldier.  His assessment of potential military threats 
reveals more clearly than any other source the range of risks that the Japanese army 
faced during its occupation of southern Taiwan.  In retrospect we know that only the 
aborigines posed a serious military threat to the Japanese, but hindsight often obscures 
potential outcomes that inﬂuence people’s actions at the time, and Wasson’s account 
provides a vivid understanding of how important it was for the expeditionary force to 
win the support of the local Chinese and mixed-race population.  Similarly, his report 
contains information found nowhere else about the role that Cassel played in planning 
the main Japanese attack against the aborigines.  Where Cassel’s letter to LeGendre 
provides only the barest outlines of the plan he drew up, Wasson’s report contains the 
actual plan that Cassel presented to Saigo¯ Tsugumichi and it describes the effort Cas-
sel made in order to obtain the best information possible about the location of roads 
and villages and the number of aborigine ﬁghters the Japanese might have to face. 
Wasson’s report thus reveals in striking detail the crucial role that Cassel played as a 
military advisor to the Japanese Army.
The report also provides unprecedented insights into the operations and behavior 
of the Japanese Army.  Whereas Cassel’s letter contains caustic criticisms of the expe-
ditionary force’s high ranking ofﬁcers, Wasson’s report focuses more on the soldiers 
who did the ﬁghting.  From Wasson’s report we get a view of what happened when a 
hybrid Japanese army, not fully beyond the traditional ethos and organization of a 
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samurai army, encountered a complex, violent local society at the periphery of the 
Qing empire.  According to Wasson, the Japanese soldiers, especially the former sam-
urai who formed the corps of volunteers that bore the brunt of the early ﬁghting, did 
not care much about the techniques of organization, discipline, and communication 
necessary for coordinated military action in a modern army.  We can see from a vari-
ety of sources, including Wasson’s report, that the Japanese Army in southern Taiwan 
differed in key respects from a modern army: it was a hybrid force, heterogeneous in 
its organization and behavior.  The bravery of the Japanese soldiers impressed Was-
son, but not the level of their discipline.  Wasson’s exasperation at the soldiers’ lack of 
discipline and organization contrasts with their headstrong determination to engage 
the enemy at the earliest opportunity.  The contrast between these two attitudes re-
veals the key difference in the way that the American advisors and the Japanese sol-
diers viewed warfare, and it shows quite starkly what separated the expeditionary 
force from Wasson’s image of a modern army.
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